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FOREWORD
By WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

T

HE need for adequate legal representation for indigents
appears and reappears with regularity. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), was the progenitor of the right of an indigent to counsel in capital cases; and it has spawned a sturdy
line from Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The law has not answered
all the problems of the indigent in the criminal system. Nor
has it resolved many of the questions in civil cases where the
indigents are clamoring for assistance.
The response of the bar to these needs has been gratifying.
Legal aid societies have risen to the occasion, supported mostly
by private funds. In the public area the public defender systems and Neighborhood Legal Services under OEO have rendered highly competent service.
In the fiscal year 1972 it is estimated that NLS has worked
on over one million legal problems - 18 percent dealing with
consumer and employment questions; 9 percent with administrative problems; 11 percent with housing; 42 percent with the
family; and 20 percent with miscellaneous matters. (Criminal
cases are largely excluded from its purview.)
As respects criminal cases, there has been the charge that
since government in public defender cases is both on the side
of the prosecution and of the defense, the indigent client is the
loser. The current Symposium on the actual operation of the
Denver system largely dispels that illusion.
Overall, the encounters of indigents with the law offer
overwhelming problems in light of the proliferating bureaucracy
under which we live. The so-called right to counsel means a
right to competent counsel- a recurring plea because once a
person loses his case the charge is often made that his counsel
was not competent.
This Denver Law Journal Symposium is only a start on
the many bristling problems in this field. But the beginning
is excellent, and a challenge to all who follow to use like
standards of excellence in appraising the elusive raw material
they encounter when they start a study of a particular court
or particular community.
William 0. Douglas
October 1972

